Two weeks of cold and concern. What will happen to electricity and gas in Ukraine by the end of winter?
FEBRUARY BRINGS TENSION AND ANXIETY
Unlike January of last year, which recorded the year's lowest temperatures, the first weeks of the new year have blessed us with warm weather, creating a deceptive sense of stability. However, the situation is shifting now, and weather forecasts indicate a drop in temperatures below -10°C for an extended period.
Last week, emergency power outages were commonplace on the left bank. Additionally, power limitation schedules for industrial consumers began to be implemented. A large-scale return to power outage schedules cannot be ruled out, although these will not be uniform across all regions. I must reiterate that the situation on the left bank is significantly more complicated due to a severe shortage of generating capacity in this area. The main power grids are simply not designed to transmit the necessary volumes of electricity from the right bank, where three nuclear power plants and an import interface are located, to the left bank.
It is necessary to respond to potential criticisms such as "Why haven't new lines been built in all this time?". Primarily because this is not a quick process, and secondly, the situation with available capacities on the left bank looked quite different just a year ago. Even at -10°C, no power outage schedules were introduced in the region. Moreover, the needs for repairs and construction of capacities were greater than ever following the campaign of enemy mass shelling.
Therefore, even in the absence of new shelling and damage, the situation with electricity supply can deteriorate. However, cold weather exacerbates the risk that attacks may become more frequent. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the target of attacks is now not only the united energy system but also the gas infrastructure.
Since the beginning of the year, the enemy has focused its strikes on storage and gas production facilities. For instance, one such local strike occurred over the weekend, as reported by the media. It seems that "Naftogaz" resorted to importing natural gas precisely due to such attacks.
Gas reserves in storage facilities are indeed low. But everything is relative. If we consider the arithmetic of normal daily production volumes (taking into account that "Ukrgasvydobuvannya" has significantly increased production during the full-scale war) and the gas reserves in storage, there should be enough gas until the end of March (although campaigns like "turn down" could not be ruled out, as was the case in 2017). However, this arithmetic is conditional, as it does not account for the risk of damage to gas infrastructure and declines in production or the ability to withdraw gas from storage. Such attacks have occurred in recent weeks. The aforementioned news about the shelling of a gas production facility is not the only one. "Bloomberg," citing its sources, reported a significant reduction in production following the attacks.
Of course, "Naftogaz" could have imported more gas in the summer. What exactly guided the company in its decisions is unknown to me; however, it is possible that throughout the year, "Naftogaz" refrained from importing gas out of fear of attacks on underground gas storage facilities, which began systematically in March-April of last year (prior to that, UGS facilities were not subject to systematic attacks).
Many questions can be directed at "Naftogaz," including regarding their strategy for working with commercial gas consumers at the end of 2024 and stockpiling. But the key problem and the main threat today are the enemy's strikes on gas infrastructure, which have significantly impacted the gas balance.
The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position. The responsibility for the published data in the "Opinions" section lies with the author.