From Zaluzhny to Trump: Key Political Trends of 2024

Political Trends of 2024

The traditional format involves summarizing the outcomes of the past year. Typically, attention is focused on the major events of the year. However, I find the trends that emerged in the socio-political life of Ukraine and around our country to be more interesting and significant.

Deterioration of the Military Situation

The most troubling trend for us over the past year has been the noticeable deterioration of the military situation, especially in the Donetsk region.

Why did this happen? At the beginning of the year (from January to April), the cessation of military aid from the U.S. due to political disagreements in Congress played a significant negative role. This allowed the Russians to considerably strengthen their resource advantage over the Ukrainian army, which in turn not only sustained but intensified the Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Additionally, Russian troops also launched attacks in the northern Kharkiv region.

The second group of reasons for this situation has internal origins — delays in mass mobilization, numerous and diverse problems with its implementation, and the accumulation and intensification of internal issues within the Ukrainian army (organizational, tactical-strategic, socio-psychological, etc.). Without overcoming these challenges, it will be difficult for us to expect positive shifts in the military situation in 2025.

North Korea's Involvement in the War Against Ukraine

A very dangerous, albeit currently localized and strategically limited trend, is the participation of North Korean troops in military actions against Ukraine. This is not yet World War III, as some suggest, but it does represent a tangible and qualitatively new level of internationalization of the war between Russia and Ukraine. If this trend expands and intensifies, it could indeed become a precursor to World War III.

Shifting Military Operations to Russian Territory

In the war between Russia and Ukraine, not only problematic trends have emerged for us, but there have also been positive developments. The most significant positive trend in resisting the Russian invasion is the transfer of military operations to Russian territory. This includes not only the Kursk offensive operation, which reminded us that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not lost their capability to conduct successful offensive operations. Even more significant, in my opinion, are the regular and quite effective airstrikes on military and infrastructure targets within Russia. It is especially noteworthy that these strikes have been precise and effective over long distances — over 1000 km (sometimes around 2000 km). These strikes were conducted by Ukrainian combat drones. Unfortunately, we received permission from our international partners to use Western long-range weapons too late — only at the end of the year, and the opportunities for their use are significantly limited. Nevertheless, this is an important manifestation of the trend of shifting military operations to Russian territory.

This trend is significant not only in military terms but also in the political-diplomatic context. Another red line has been crossed, which our international partners had drawn for themselves and for us.

Fluctuations in Western Aid to Ukraine

The year 2024 has been very contradictory regarding Western assistance for Ukraine. At the beginning of the year, there was a prolonged (lasting four months) pause in American aid. However, during this time, Ukraine's European partners became more active. In February, a new long-term financial support instrument for Ukraine called the "Ukraine Facility" was approved by the European Union. This program is set for 2024-2027, through which Ukraine will receive assistance amounting to €50 billion. Also in February, Czech President Petr Pavel initiated the creation of a special fund to procure hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for Ukraine. About 20 European countries joined this fund. The implementation of the "Czech Initiative" significantly alleviated the shell shortage that the Ukrainian military was facing. Additionally, in 2024, the "Danish Initiative" emerged, aimed at strengthening cooperation in weapon production and military technology development in Ukraine.

In July 2024, at the NATO summit, a $50 billion aid package for Ukraine for 2025 was approved by the G7 countries. The distinctive feature of this package is that the collateral for it (for reimbursement of funds that will support Ukraine) consists of Russian assets in the West. This marks the first significant step (and establishes a fundamental precedent) in utilizing Russian assets for the benefit of Ukraine. However, the coordination of the political, legal, and organizational mechanisms for this aid package has been prolonged for almost six months. Nevertheless, Ukraine has already received the first billions of this aid by the end of 2024.

Breakthrough in the Development of Ukraine's Defense Industry

In 2024, there was a genuine breakthrough in the development of Ukraine's defense industry. While not all information is publicly available, here are some known figures: at the beginning of the year, there were 300 companies; now there are over 1000 engaged in the development, production of weapons and military equipment (WME), services, and related works; the workforce in this sector increased from 70,000 to over 300,000; production capabilities grew from $1.5 billion to $30 billion with a trend of growth. The main priority for Ukraine's defense industry in 2024 became combat drones. According to Ukrainian Defense Minister R. Umierov, in 2024, Ukrainian enterprises produced and assembled: over 1.5 million FPV drones, strike bomber drones, kamikaze planes, reconnaissance wing drones, and long-range deep-strike drones. In 2024, combat drones produced in Ukraine accounted for over 96% of all UAVs used by the Defense Forces.

However, there are still numerous problems in this area — financial, security-related, organizational, and purely bureaucratic. Unfortunately, there are sometimes serious issues with product quality. The lack of funds for military production is perhaps the main problem today. The production capacities of the industry are utilized only at 30-40%. However, this problem also indicates significant potential for the development of the domestic defense industry.

Security Agreements with Western Partners

An important trend in 2024 was the conclusion of security agreements with our international partners. Over the year, nearly three dozen such agreements were signed, particularly with all G7 countries and the European Union. A multilateral document called the Ukraine Compact was signed with NATO, which contains commitments for the security support of Ukraine. These agreements do not provide security guarantees in the strictest sense of the term, but they legally and politically formalize the long-term (10 years) commitments of our partners to provide political, military (arms and ammunition supplies), and economic support to Ukraine. Essentially, this marks the beginning of the formation of a coalition of partners for Ukraine in the field of security.

Peacekeeping Activity

In 2024, there was a significant activation of various initiatives and proposals aimed at ending the war between Russia and Ukraine — from peace plans by China and Brazil to pseudo-peacekeeping performances by Orbán. Even Putin spoke about peace, albeit exclusively on ultimatum Russian terms. Ukraine also began to promote its own format of the peace process — Global Peace Summits. This was an attempt from the Ukrainian side to organize international pressure on Russia to compel the Putin regime to end its war against Ukraine. It was also an effort to initiate a peace process format based on the UN Charter, serving as an alternative to the Russian position and other "peace plans" that did not meet Ukraine's interests at that time.

At the end of 2024, the victory of Trump in the U.S. presidential elections and his intentions to end the war in Ukraine provided a new impetus for peacekeeping activity.

The paradox of this trend, which actually began in 2023, is that while there has been much talk about peace and ending the war, this has not led to the start of any real peace negotiations. Therefore, it is more accurate to describe it as peacekeeping activity. Nonetheless, by the end of 2024, the movement towards future peace negotiations became much more evident than a year ago.

Personnel Changes in Ukrainian Authorities

An interesting and ambiguous trend of 2024 has been the large-scale personnel changes in the state structures of Ukrainian authorities.

At the beginning of the year, there was a change in the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and part of the military leadership. The dismissal of Valerii Zaluzhnyi from the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces became the most resonant personnel decision of 2024. However, the most extensive personnel changes occurred in the Cabinet, which saw its composition updated by almost half throughout the year. Certain personnel changes also took place in the Office of the President of Ukraine, in the leadership of regional state administrations, and in some other state structures. At the end of 2024, a large-scale rotation began in the diplomatic corps.

Through these extensive personnel changes, the Ukrainian government clearly sought to inject new momentum into the work of the state apparatus. However, the paradox of the situation is that these significant personnel changes did not result in any meaningful shifts in state policy.

Contradictory Trends in the Transformation of Public Opinion

Ambiguous yet indicative processes manifested throughout 2024 in the public opinion of Ukraine.

Perhaps for the first time since the full-scale Russian invasion, we have clearly formed directly opposing camps regarding the dilemma of choosing between war and peace.