"Russians advanced over the bodies of their soldiers." Insights into the operations and listening capabilities of the GUR's electronic intelligence.

The electronic intelligence units of the GUR are monitoring the enemy in the occupied territories of our country and within Russia itself. All of the Russians' plans become known to our scouts even before they are executed. Military electronic reconnaissance knows the names of the aggressor country's criminals and their locations. The work of electronic reconnaissance and the horrors of war were discussed in an interview with RBC-Ukraine by a military representative of the GUR.

Watch the full conversation on the RBC-Ukraine YouTube channel. Below is a shortened version of the interview. For security reasons, we do not disclose the name or position of the military representative.

– What is your favorite FM radio station? – the interlocutor unexpectedly asks at the beginning of the interview. – When you leave Kyiv and drive to Lviv, you pass just a couple of kilometers, and your favorite radio station stops functioning. Why does this happen?

– The waves no longer operate in that frequency range, – I suggest.

– Why not? The waves work when a ship goes out to sea. Or, for example, when a plane flies, the waves are still effective?

– Satellites? – I try to guess the right answer.

– No, it's still radio communication, just a different frequency range. Depending on the frequency, we can transmit or receive information. In a car, you will hear music, but in an airplane, you won’t hear it, instead, you will hear some crackling transmissions, radio messages. It's all physics. And our main ally is physics.

Moreover, you use mobile phones and Bluetooth. Mobile phones and Bluetooth also emit signals. This signal can also be intercepted. So what does your device do? It intercepts the radio signal and then retransmits it through the speakers. Therefore, any device that emits radio waves can be intercepted.

– How is the interception of Russians carried out?

– It's very simple. For us, anything that emits is already a source. There is a certain stage of searching for the source of radio emissions – these are radio waves. Then, the analysis of these signals continues, decryption, and demodulation takes place. From this information, which seems to be numbers and noise, we derive semantics.

Semantics, roughly speaking, are the sounds we are all familiar with, which we have on our website, or the interception of some civilian or military communications. But it can also include videos, faxes, or anything that can be transmitted via radio waves. And at the final stage, we as a system must provide a real informational product.

But we do not stop there. We also have operational-technical and analytical activities that allow us to do the most important thing – identify the enemy and determine their numbers. And the highest mastery is when we predict what the enemy will do. And again, I repeat, this is thanks to the established system of electronic intelligence.

Ukraine is unique in that our country has an electronic intelligence system. Very few countries in the world can boast the establishment of an electronic intelligence system.

– When did we start developing the electronic intelligence system? Did this begin during the full-scale war or even earlier?

– In fact, from the very first day of independence in Ukraine, there were already individual elements. They were inherited from the Soviet Union. Thanks to patriotic and initiative-driven officers, the system at that time was relatively effective for those tasks. However, over time, our equipment became older.

The world made a quantum leap in the development of information technologies. We lagged behind in this regard. There were certain processes, reductions in the armed forces. It was a great advantage for those leaders who managed to preserve the system. Because, as far as I know, we were on the brink of not having it at all.

During the first decades of independence, our tactical-level electronic intelligence was completely destroyed. Unfortunately, by 2014, we virtually had no tactical intelligence, and we felt this from the very first days of the Russian aggression. This was the first element that was a deficiency in our system.

– Did the Russians develop electronic intelligence?

– First of all, they preserved the Soviet system. Secondly, they managed to maintain virtually all levels – tactical, operational, and even strategic electronic intelligence. They also faced issues with modern samples, but in the mid-2000s, they were able to improve their electronic intelligence system, and new complexes emerged.

1Photo: Intelligence has means to identify the enemy and determine their numbers (Vitaliy Nosach/RBC-Ukraine)

At that time, in the 2000s, we had unique developments in contrast to the Russians. Everyone knows about "Kolchuga," which was a unique complex. The Russians still cannot create anything similar. There is one technological moment that originated during the Soviet Union. There is a unique block, these technologies were with our specialists. The Russians still have not been able to replicate them. It was difficult for the Russians to create a unified system to combine all three levels of electronic intelligence.

In 2014, we did not have tactical electronic intelligence. That is the first point. The second and most important point is the specialists.

We have an entire unit that deals with software. These are analysts, not only analyzing signals but also the military-political situation of the enemy. A very powerful team. These are highly intellectual individuals who must represent physical processes – not physiology, but physics. And, in addition, they need to be well-versed in the entire subject area.

By 2014, we had problems. At that time, there were no domestic complexes of that format. However, we quickly exploited some foreign samples. But they, like now, were absolutely not adapted to modern warfare. Let me give you an example. We primarily use our samples now, but we have the ability, and this has even become a trend for some countries – to provide our equipment for such combat trials. And once we were given such equipment.

One of the elements of the complex is the antenna system. It was in a white radio-transparent dome. And as soon as we looked at this white dome, it was clear – demasking was necessary. But it wouldn’t suffice to simply take khaki-colored paint; appropriate technologies are needed for this radio-transparent dome to then receive radio signals.

We had to adopt some acquired camouflage methods. Moreover, their software is great, excellent, but it is not adapted to Russian communication systems. Some adjustments had to be made to adapt it to our battlefield.

– Does electronic intelligence participate in planning operations? Do you transmit information and strategically plan together with some unit?

– Any military operation begins with planning. Any military plan starts with the first point – assessing the enemy. And this is the immediate "bread" of intelligence.

Our main task is to determine the enemy's composition: their numbers, their positions, where they are located, and what state of combat readiness they are in. And the highest mastery is to predict their actions or know them. Therefore, no planned operation has taken place without the involvement of intelligence.

2Photo: The GUR has a unit where analysts assess the military-political situation of the enemy (armyinform.com.ua)

– When there were successful operations in Kharkiv and Kherson, was it primarily due to the tactical level of intelligence and planning thanks to intelligence? Or is this the main guarantee of the success of those operations?

– We directly participated in assessing the enemy. Our advantage is that even before the full-scale war, we were already monitoring the enemy. We knew the specifics of their organization.

We had unique sources that allowed us to obtain information quickly, reliably, and from great distances. That is, when a unit was already moving in, we would say: "Before you stands a unit of the level: company, battalion, division." If we had already refined the information, we would say that the first company of the third battalion of the 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the first tank army was standing there.

Additionally, our main task is to determine the enemy's composition, position, and nature of their actions. We are also assigned specific tasks. For example, determining the moral and psychological state of the enemy.

Through interceptions, we can assess the moral and psychological state, but that is our subjective assessment. We are not psychologists. However, we have some specialists in our units. We can evaluate their preliminary state. The guys enter the position, and if we have interaction with them, if they are ready to listen to us and trust us, we can provide such information.

– How did your work proceed during the Kharkiv operation?

– During the counteroffensive operation in Kharkiv, we knew where the enemy was located. We even knew the names of the unit commanders. And this helped.