Denis Smazhny: Initially, Russian shelling was predictable, but they are learning rapidly.

Colonel Denis Smazhny, an officer of the Ukrainian Air Force Command, spoke in an interview with RBC-Ukraine about how Ukraine's air defense has evolved during the war and how it manages to counter Russian missile attacks and "Shaheds."

– This conversation takes place on the days when we are marking a tragic anniversary in our history. Three years ago, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What was the state of Ukrainian air defense at that time?

– At the moment of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian air defense consisted of outdated Soviet-era anti-aircraft missile systems. The only advantage that saved us from Russian air attacks was the sufficient number of guided anti-aircraft missiles. So, despite the fact that the systems themselves were outdated and not very effective, we had enough missiles.

– In the first weeks of the Russian invasion, as I understand it, their aviation still had the audacity to penetrate deep into our airspace. Am I correct?

– Yes. At that time, they attempted to penetrate deep into our territory. I believe this was primarily due to them being victims of their own propaganda. At that time, enemy military spokespeople reported that all air defense in Ukraine had been completely destroyed, and they could freely fly in and bomb our cities.

There were quite bold attempts by the Russians to fly over our territory. There were cases when they reached Myrhorod and Zolotonosha. Our anti-aircraft gunners had the opportunity to shoot them down even over Vasylkiv. They tried to penetrate fairly deep.

– When did these attempts cease, and at what point did their enemy aviation stop entering our airspace after the beginning of the large-scale invasion?

– Actively, Russian pilots tried to penetrate deep into Ukraine in the first weeks of the full-scale invasion when the occupiers aimed to capture Kyiv and penetrate deep into the Kharkiv region. Thanks to the active actions of our air defense and, without exaggeration, the heroism of our anti-aircraft warriors and fighter pilots, we managed to inflict huge losses on Russian aviation and drive it out of our airspace.

However, the Russians continued to operate actively in the sky, albeit not deep within our territory, but still within the strike zone of our anti-aircraft missile systems. The downing of enemy aircraft continued, their pilots began to refuse to carry out missions, and about two months after the full-scale invasion, they completely stopped entering the strike zone of our air defense systems.

– Also, if I understand correctly, it was during the first hours that the first missile strikes from Russia were either largely or mainly aimed at air defense facilities?

– Correct. The initial attacks they carried out targeted the positions of anti-aircraft missile units, the positions of radio-technical troops, and airfields – those positions that had been used by our forces for years. They were attacked. And I think that precisely because they attacked them, they had the illusion that all these assets were destroyed.

– So I understand that these strikes on air defense positions – it's like what's written in textbooks: first, you need to suppress the enemy's air defense (at that time, we were in that role), and then proceed with the ground invasion, and so on. It's clear that this Russian plan – to suppress our air defense – at that time failed. What was the reason for that?

– Doctrinally, in all leading armies of the world, it is prescribed that first, you must suppress air defense, and only then begin ground and air operations. However, the Russians decided to act simultaneously in all directions: in the first hours and days, they tried to destroy our air defense while simultaneously starting a ground operation. This is one of the reasons why the enemy could not realize its ambitious plans.

Primarily because we had high maneuverability. Thanks to high maneuverability and the dispersal of all our forces and means – most of our units were relocated to different places – we survived the initial strike and preserved our potential. By regrouping the forces and means we had in various directions, we were able to hold back the superior enemy and prevent the Russians from achieving air supremacy.

– Since there was such a rapid, operational response from the Air Force units to the initial strikes, I understand that you were preparing for the invasion and such attacks?

– Yes, we were receiving intelligence data and preemptively forming our units in the most threatening directions of attack. Moreover, the military always prepares for war: preparing backup positions, conducting exercises to withdraw units from under strikes, repelling air attacks, live firing at aerial targets, various training...

– Do you remember, in the first months after the start of the large war, society – civilians, activists, volunteers, and certain Western officials who also supported us, called upon, both publicly and on social media – for Western partners to help and close the sky over Ukraine? In that more detailed context, it implied that we needed to be given Patriot and everything possible.

At that time, we heard from Western leaders and decision-makers that they could not provide such systems, that it was impossible, that it required very long training and that they were very difficult to master. However, time went on, and we began to receive these systems, not after a long period – a year has passed since the arrival of the first Patriot battery. Why, when everyone was asking, were they not provided to us to help close the sky?

– Because no one believed in Ukraine. No one believed in Ukrainians, and no one believed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the world. Imagine this situation: we ask for Patriots, other expensive weapons – Western partners provide them, and after a while, the Russians capture us and also seize all these expensive technological weapon systems. None of the partners wanted to take such risks, not believing in our success.

But several months of intense fighting by Ukrainians with the existing outdated weapons in our hands showed the whole world that this nation will never surrender, this nation will fight to the end with any weapon. And this broke the perception of our partners – they could entrust us with weapons, let’s start with something small, something not so high-tech and effective.

Before we received the Patriot, we were receiving other anti-aircraft missile systems – both new ones, like modern Iris-T, NASAMS, and quite old models – Gepard, Crotale, and so on. Gradually, partners realized that they could trust us with any weapon. Therefore, although with a significant delay, we received the Patriot and are now using it effectively.

– At that time, Western media reported that, according to their information, Ukrainians surprised foreign partners with the speed of mastering these systems. Is that true or not?

– Yes, they were shocked. First and foremost, we sent the most experienced and well-prepared individuals who knew what anti-aircraft missile systems were. Therefore, there was no need to train them from scratch. They only needed to be retrained on other types of weapons that are much easier to learn and manage.

So yes – they were surprised when our defenders arrived at the courses, were given basic things, and our people asked: let’s restructure the program because we already know all this, we are ready to learn practical applications. Western instructors quickly adapted the training program, and our warriors mastered the new weapon very quickly.

– We had Soviet complexes, and now we are receiving Western complexes. Were there difficulties in integrating them into a unified air defense system to ensure effectiveness?

– Integrating outdated Soviet, outdated Western, and the newest Western complexes into a unified system is quite a challenging task from a technical perspective. This issue continues to be resolved through joint efforts. But the difficulties are not only at the level of instrumental integration. All these complexes need to be integrated into a unified air defense system of the country: distributed by directions, positioned systems of different classes and ranges at different positions, defined areas of responsibility, established information exchange, and management systems.

We are effectively addressing this task, as we have smart specialists who find unconventional solutions. We have our own software and combat control equipment, into which we have gradually integrated various types of weapons, using various non-NATO information exchange protocols. This type of integration is always implemented in the initial stages. After all, our main goal is to provide the most effective air defense cover for critical infrastructure, cities, and troop groupings using the available means.

– But the enemy also adapts to new challenges. What new tactics are the Russians employing in attempts to bypass and penetrate our air defense?

– Attempts are constantly being made. If in the early stages of the war they had quite template attacks and did not particularly learn from their mistakes, recently they have been learning very quickly. They change routes, altitudes of all means of air attack, and modify the tactics of using ballistic weapons and various munitions – both Korean